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Cake day: August 14th, 2023

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  • A very important point is that the judge can’t just reject the deal and let Alex Jones continue forward. The whole reason why the licensing deal is coming to fruition now (instead of in 2024 when he first lost control, or after all the appeals are exhausted) is because this middle ground became untenable: Alex Jones can’t afford the studio’s rent and the creditors are going to seize all the physical assets if they’re not being actively used to run a profitable business to preserve the status quo.

    If the status quo is no longer an option, the court will have to order that SOMEthing happen.



  • This is the best article I’ve found, and it’s more recent than the NYT article you’ve posted:

    https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/the-onions-infowars-takeover-follows-complicated-legal-journey

    I still find dedicated legal reporting to be better than general reporting. And this is a complicated history touching on a lot of different areas of the law.

    But the key fact here is that Alex Jones was allowed to keep control over the business assets while his appeals are pending, but has run out of money and cannot continue running his own business. At that point, the receiver overseeing things (where Alex Jones can run the business but can’t transfer assets out or pay anything not directly related to running the business) saw that things had changed enough that he needed to keep the business assets valuable, and that Alex Jones himself couldn’t.

    So this licensing deal is a way to keep the assets valuable: keep paying rent on the studio itself, keep all the broadcasting and recording equipment under one roof, keep all the unexpired contracts.

    If Alex Jones can’t come up with a plan to actually pay the rent and keep all the stuff, the court is basically going to have no choice but to agree that there’s no way to keep things as they are while the appeals wind through the system, and a temporary licensing agreement is the best option until the appeals go through.

    Most of the reporting doesn’t seem to appreciate that Jones’ prospects of blocking this in the courts is dependent on a practical hurdle, not just a legal one: he can’t afford to keep it. That’s what’s changed since December 2024 when The Onion’s first attempt to buy this stuff was blocked (by another federal bankruptcy court, with a different judge than this state court judge overseeing the receiver).




  • I don’t agree with the implicit assumption that the people who are bullied have to be actual nerds/geeks. People get bullied for being different, whatever that may be, and Elon strikes me as a real weirdo.

    And of course that assumes a lack of charisma, which of course describes Elon. Charismatic weirdos can actually set trends to follow, whereas uncharismatic weirdos tend to become social pariahs.





  • It’s cheaper to pay cash than use insurance.

    Yes, for most people, in most years. But the cost of health care tends to be very, very unevenly distributed. A person might see medical bills of less than $1000 per year for 20 years and then get a single $1,000,000 year. So at that point, it’s an annualized cost of $50,000 per year, even if most years it’s about $1,000. Some estimates are that 10-30% of all medical spending in the US is in the last year of life.

    Many believe that because of this distribution, health insurance should primarily be a catastrophic care model where most people pay a premium that doesn’t cover anything for the first few thousand, then covers a percentage of the cost up to the out of pocket maximum of like $15,000 or so for a family, but does cover everything after that. For a typical household, being able to predict annual healthcare expenses for the entire year is very useful.

    And personally, I’m pretty sympathetic to this catastrophic care model as a short term transition to an all payer model that looks like Switzerland’s system (private insurance, private providers, mandatory coverage, strict price controls, and subsidies for anyone who can’t afford the normal premiums).



  • To be clear, women’s work before World War II was more than just the dishes. If you look at the guidebooks published for housewives back then, you’ll see that they were expected to have quite a few skills that most households now generally outsourc to external businesses:

    • Feeding the family. This was more than just cooking. They were expected to process foods from a much less processed state (much more butchery of meats and cleaning and processing of vegetable products, dairy products, baked goods), and then preserve foods for out-of-season consumption (pickling, preserving in jams/jellies, home canning, drying, and in some cultures smoking). Much of this work is now done by the industrial food processing industry so that we can buy cans or jars or boxes of the stuff that’s already processed or partially processed. Even our fresh foods have been cleaned and sorted and trimmed to mainly just the edible parts.
    • Making and maintaining textiles. We see bits of this surviving into knitting and crocheting as hobbies, but back before the rise of cheap apparel it was important to be able to clean and repair clothes that we’d now just take to our local dry cleaner.
    • Maintaining the house itself. Home improvement is masculine coded today, but a lot of the stuff that qualifies as home maintenance was traditionally the work of a homemaker. Plus things like heating the house required active involvement of keeping fires burning and fuel on hand.
    • Making household consumables. Homemakers were making their own soap, their own candles, and all sorts of little tools.

    The economic shifts that come from women leaving the home for the paid workforce are all over, and some of them are pretty pronounced. But it’s important to remember that women worked hard before they ever got paid for it. Life was toil.


  • It’s not actually a clear inverse relationship on the individual level, even if the data shows a correlation at the national level.

    There are a few things happening that complicate the analysis at the individual level, too:

    • Wealth/income are correlated with age, and 40 year olds tend to have both higher incomes and lower fertility rates than 25 year olds.
    • Wealth also correlates with race, for better or for worse, and there have always been persistent differences in birth rates by race.
    • The sample sizes aren’t big enough to show whether the very rich (95th+ percentile) actually reverse the trend, to where being richer is correlated with higher birth rates, where the curve ticks back upward at very high incomes.
    • The correlation is actually the other direction when looking at the individual incomes in certain countries (Netherlands, Sweden, Norway), and the effect is stronger when looking at men and their incomes.

    Other country level data also suggest that there are big cultural factors in birth rates as well.

    All in all, the relationship between income and fertility is complicated, with lots of other factors at play.